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Abstract. Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair
and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we
study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from
the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these
games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path
from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on
dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games,
we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus
of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and
nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined
on both directed and undirected network.
1 Introduction
One of the important problems in cooperative game is how to distribute the total
profit generated by a group of agents to individual participants. The prerequisite
here is to make all the agents work together, i.e., form a grand coalition. To
achieve this goal, the collective profit should be distributed properly so as to
minimize the incentive of subgroups of agents to deviate and form coalitions of
their own. This intuition is formally captured by several solution concepts, such
as the core, the least-core, and the nucleolus, which will be the focus of this
paper.
In this paper, we consider a kind of cooperative game models, path cooperative
games (PC-games), arising from the situations where some commodity (traffic,
liquid or information) flows through a network. In these games, each player
controls an edge or a vertex of the network (called edge path cooperative games
or vertex edge path cooperative games, respectively), a coalition of players wins
if it enables a path from the source to the sink, and lose otherwise. We will
focus on the algorithmic problems on game solutions of path cooperative games,
especially core related solutions.
Path cooperative games have a natural correspondence with flow games. Flow
games were first introduced by Kalai and Zemel [13] and studied extensively by
many researchers. When there are public arcs in the network, the core of the
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flow game is nonempty if and only if there is a minimum (s, t)-cut containing
no public arcs. And in this case, the core can be characterized by the minimum
(s, t)-cuts [13, 18], and the nucleolus can also be computed efficiently [5, 17].
Recently, Aziz et al. [1] introduced the threshold versions of monotone games,
including PC-games as a special case. Yoram [3] showed that computing ε-core
for threshold network flow games is polynomial time solvable for unit capacity
networks, and NP-hard for networks with general capacities. For PC-games de-
fined on series-parallel graphs, Aziz et al. [1] showed that the nucleolus can be
computed in polynomial time. However, the complexity of computing the nucle-
olus for general PC-games remains open, from the algorithmic point of view, the
solution concepts of general PC-games have not been systematically discussed.
The algorithmic problems in cooperative games are especially interesting,
since except for the fairness and rationality requirements in the solution defi-
nitions, computational complexity is suggested be taken into consideration as
another measure of rationality for evaluating and comparing different solution
concepts (Deng and Papadimitriou [6]). Until now, various interesting complex-
ity and algorithmic results have been investigated. On one hand, efficient al-
gorithms have been proposed for computing the core, the least-core and the
nucleolus for, such as, assignment games [20], cardinality matching games [14],
unit flow games [5] and weighted voting games [8]. On the other hand, negative
results are also given. For example, the problems of computing the nucleolus
and testing whether a given distribution belongs to the core or the nucleolus are
proved to be NP-hard for minimum spanning tree games [9,10], flow games and
linear production games [5, 11].
The main contribution of this work is the efficient characterizations of the
CS-core, least-core and the nucleolus of PC-games, based on linear programming
technique and the relationship with flow games. These characterizations yield
directly to efficient algorithms for the related solutions. The organization of the
paper is as follows.
In section 2, the relevant definitions in cooperative game are introduced. In
section 3, we first define PC-games (edge path cooperative game and vertex
path cooperative game), and then give the the characterizations of the core and
CS-core. Section 4 is dedicated to the efficient description of the least-core for
PC-games. In section 5, we prove that the nucleolus is polynomially solvable for
both edge and vertex path cooperative games.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game Γ = (N, γ) consists of a player set N = {1, 2, · · · , n} and
a characteristic function γ : 2N → R with γ(∅) = 0. For each coalition S ⊆ N ,
γ(S) represents the profit obtained by S without help of other players. The set
N is called the grand coalition. In what follows, we assume that γ(S) ≥ 0 for all
S ⊆ N , and γ(∅) = 0.
An imputation of Γ is a payoff vector x = (x1, ...xn) such that
∑
i∈N xi =
γ(N) and xi ≥ γ({i}), ∀i ∈ N . The set of imputations is denoted by I(Γ ).
Throughout this paper, we use the shorthand notation x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. Given a
payoff vector x ∈ I(Γ ), the excess of coalition S ⊆ N with respect to x is defined
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as: e(x, S) = x(S)−γ(S). This value measures the degree of S’s satisfaction with
the payoff x.
Core. The core of a game Γ , denoted by C(Γ ), is the set of payoff vectors
satisfying that, x ∈ C(Γ ) if and only if e(x, S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N . These
constraints, called group rationality, ensure that no coalition would have an
incentive to split from the grand coalition N, and do better on its own.
Least-core. When C(Γ ) is empty, it is meaningful to relax the group rationality
constraints by e(x, S) ≥ ε for all S ⊆ N . We shall find the maximum value ε∗
such that the set {x ∈ I(Γ ) : e(x, S) ≥ ε∗,∀S ⊆ N} is nonempty. This set of
imputations is called the least-core, denoted by LC(Γ ), and ε∗ is called the value
of LC(Γ ) or LC-value.
Nucleolus. Now we turn to the concept of the nucleolus. A payoff vector x
generates a 2n-dimensional excess vector θ(x) = (e(x, S1), · · · , e(x, S2n)), whose
components are arranged in a non-decreasing order. That is, e(x, Si) ≤ e(x, Sj)
for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 2n. The nucleolus, denoted by η(Γ ), is defined to be a payoff
vector that lexicographically maximizes the excess vector θ(x) over the set of
imputations I(Γ ). It was proved by Schmeidler [19] that the nucleolus of a game
with the nonempty imputation set contains exactly one element.
Monotone games and simple games. A game Γ = (N, γ) is monotone
if γ(S′) ≤ γ(S) whenever S′ ⊆ S. A game is called a simple game if it is a
monotonic game with γ : 2N → {0, 1} such that γ(∅) = 0 and γ(N) = 1.
Simple games can be usually used to model situations where there is a task to
be completed, a coalition is labeled as winning if and only if it can complete the
task. Formally, coalition S ⊆ N is winning if γ(S) = 1, and losing if γ(S) = 0.
A player i is called a veto player if he or she belongs to all winning coalitions. It
is easy to see that, in a simple game, i is a veto player if and only if γ(N) = 1
but γ(N \ {i}) = 0.
For simple games, Osborne [16] and Elkind et al. [7] gave the following result
on the core and the nucleolus.
Lemma 1 A simple game Γ = (N, γ) has a nonempty core if and only if there
exists a veto player. Moreover,
1. x ∈ C(Γ ) if and only if xi = 0 for each i ∈ N who is not a veto player;
2. when C(Γ ) 6= ∅, the nucleolus of Γ is given by xi = 1k if i is a veto player
and xi = 0 otherwise, where k is the number of veto players.
CS-core. Taking coalition structure into consideration, we can arrive at an-
other solution concept, CS-core. Given a cooperative game Γ = (N, γ), a coali-
tion structure over N is a partition of N , i.e., a collection of subsets CS =
{C1, · · · , Ck} with ∪kj=1Cj = N and Ci ∩Cj = ∅ for i 6= j and i, j ∈ {1, · · · , k}.
A vector x = (x1, · · · , xn) is a payoff vector for a coalition structure CS =
{C1, · · · , Ck} if xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , and x(Cj) = γ(Cj) for each j ∈ {1, · · · , k}.
In general, an outcome of the game Γ is a pair (CS, x), where CS is a coali-
tion structure and x is a corresponding payoff vector. The CS-core of the game
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Γ = (N, γ), denoted by Ccs(Γ ), is the set of outcomes (CS, x) satisfying the
constraints of “group rationality”. That is,
Ccs(Γ ) = {(CS, x) : ∀C ∈ CS, x(C) = γ(C) and ∀S ⊆ N, x(S) ≥ γ(S)}.
A stronger property that is also enjoyed by many practically useful games is
superadditivity. The game Γ = (N, γ) is superadditive if it satisfies γ(S1 ∪S2) ≥
γ(S1) + γ(S2) for every pair of disjoint coalitions S1, S2 ⊆ N . This implies that
the agents can earn at least as much profit by working together within the
grand coalition. Therefore, for superadditive games, it is always assumed that
the agents form the grand coalition. For a (non-superadditive) game Γ = (N, γ),
we can define a new game Γ ∗ = (N, γ∗) by setting
γ∗(S) = max
CS∈CS
S
γ(CS ), ∀S ⊆ N
where CS
S
denotes the space of all coalition structures over S and γ(CS ) =∑
C∈CS γ(C). It is easy to verify that the game Γ
∗ is superadditive, and it
is called the superadditive cover of Γ . The relationship between the CS-core
of Γ and the core of its superadditive cover Γ ∗ is presented in the following
lemma [4,12].
Lemma 2 A cooperative game Γ = (N, γ) has nonempty CS-core if and only if
its superadditive cover Γ ∗ = (N, γ∗) has a non-empty core. Moreover, if C(Γ ∗) 6=
∅, then Ccs(Γ ) = C(Γ ∗).
3 Path Cooperative Game and Its Core
Let D = (V,E; s, t) be a connected flow network with unit arc capacity (called
unit flow network), where V is the vertex set, E is the arc set, s, t ∈ V are the
source and the sink of the network respectively. In this paper, an (s, t)-path is
referred to a directed path from s to t that visits each vertex in V at most once.
Let U,W ⊆ V be a partition of the vertex set V such that s ∈ U and t ∈W ,
then the set of arcs with heads in U and tails in W is called an (s, t)-edge-
cut, denoted by E¯ ⊆ E. An (s, t)-vertex-cut is a vertex subset V¯ ⊆ V \ {s, t}
such that D \ V¯ is disconnected. An (s, t)-edge(vertex)-cut is minimum if its
cardinality is minimum. In the remainder of the paper, (s, t)-edge(vertex)-cuts
will be abbreviated as edge(vertex)-cut S for short. Given an edge-cut E¯, we
denote its indicator vector by HE¯ ∈ {0, 1}|E|, where HE¯(e) = 1 if e ∈ E¯, and 0
otherwise. The indicator vector of a vertex-cut is defined analogously.
Now we introduce two kinds of path cooperative games (PC-games), edge
path cooperative games and vertex path cooperative games.
Definition 1 (Path cooperative game, PC-game) Let D = (V,E; s, t) be a
unit flow network.
1. The associated edge path cooperative game (EPC-game) ΓE = (E, γE) is:
− The player set is E;
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− ∀S ⊆ E,
{
γE(S) = 1 if D[S] admits an (s, t)-path;
γE(S) = 0 otherwise.
Here, D[S] denotes the induced subgraph with vertex set V and edge set S.
2. The associated vertex path cooperative game(VPC-game) ΓV = (V, γV ) is:
− The player set is V \ {s, t};
− ∀T ⊆ V ,
{
γV (T ) = 1 if induced subgraph D[T ] admits an (s, t)-path;
γV (T ) = 0 otherwise.
Clearly, PC-games fall into the class of simple games. Therefore, we can get
the necessary and sufficient condition of the non-emptiness of the core directly
from Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 Given an EPC-game ΓE and a VPC-game ΓV associated with
network D = (V,E; s, t), then
1. C(ΓE) 6= ∅ if and only if the size of the minimum edge-cut of D is 1;
2. C(ΓV ) 6= ∅ if and only if the size of the minimum vertex-cut of D is 1.
Moreover, when the core of a PC-game is nonempty, the only edge (vertex)
in the edge(vertex)-cut is a veto player, both the core and the nucleolus can be
given directly. In the following two sections, we only consider PC-games with
empty core.
We note that PC-games also have a natural correspondence with flow games
and in what follows, we will reveal the close relationship between flow games and
PC-games. Let D = (V,E; s, t) be a unit flow network. Given N ⊆ E, each edge
e ∈ N is controlled by one player, i.e., we can identify the set of edges N with
the set of players. Edges not under control of any players, in E \ N , are called
public arcs; they can be used freely by any coalition. Thus, a unit flow network
with player set N is denoted as D〈N〉 = (V,E; s, t)
Definition 2 (Simple flow game) The simple flow game Γf 〈N〉 = (N, γ)
associated with the unit network D〈N〉 is defined as:
1. The player set is N ;
2. ∀S ⊆ N , γ(S) is the value of the max-flow from s to t in D[S ∪ (E \ N)]
(using only the edges in S and public edges).
Flow game is a classical combinatorial optimization game, which has been
extensively studied. The core of the flow game Γf 〈N〉 is nonempty if and only if
there is a minimum edge-cut without public edges [18]. In this case, the core is
exactly the convex hull of the indicator vectors of minimum edge-cuts without
public edges in D [13,18], and the nucleolus can also be computed in polynomial
time [5, 17].
Now we turn to discuss the CS-core of PC-games. It is easy to see that for the
network D without public edges, the associated flow game is the superadditive
cover of the corresponding EPC-game. Thus, the nonemptiness of CS-core of
EPC-game is followed directly from Lemma 2.
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Proposition 2 Given an EPC-game ΓE associated with network D = (V,E; s, t),
then the CS-core of ΓE is nonempty and it is exactly the convex hull of the in-
dicator vectors of minimum edge-cuts of D.
For a VPC-game, we can also establish some relationship with a flow game.
Given a network D = (V,E; s, t), we transform it into a new network DV in the
following way.
(1) For each v ∈ V \ {s, t}, split it into two distinct vertices v′ and v′′;
(2) Connect v′ and v′′ by a new directed edge ev = (v′, v′′). The set of all
such edges is denoted by EV ;
(3) For original edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, transform it into a new edge e = (u′′, v′)
in DV (s = s
′ = s′′ and t = t′ = t′′).
In the new constructed network DV , the player set is just the set EV and all
the other edges are viewed as public edges. It is easy to show that in the new
network DV , there must be a minimum edge-cut containing only edges in EV .
Hence, we can verify that the flow game associated with the network DV 〈EV 〉 is
the superadditive cover of the corresponding VPC-game defined on D. Similarly,
the nonemptiness of CS-core of VPC-game is followed from Lemma 2 and the
results of core nonemptiness of flow games.
Proposition 3 Given an VPC-game ΓV associated with network D = (V,E; s, t),
then the CS-core of ΓV is nonempty and it is exactly the convex hull of the in-
dicator vectors of minimum vertex-cuts of D.
4 Least-core of PC-Games
In this section, we first discuss the least-core of EPC-games. Throughout this
section, ΓE is an EPC-game associated with the network D = (V,E; s, t) with
|E| = n. Denote by P the set of all (s,t)-path in D, and |P| = m. According to
the definitions of EPC-game and the least-core, it is shown that LC(ΓE) can be
formulated as the following linear program:
max ε
s.t.
x(E) = 1x(P ) ≥ 1 + ε ∀P ∈ P
xi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ E
(1)
In spite that the number of the constrains in (1) may be exponential in |E|,
the LC-value and a least-core imputation can be found efficiently by ellipsoid
algorithm with a polynomial-time separation oracle: Let (x, ε) be a candidate
solution for LP(LCE). We first check whether constraints x(E) = 1 and x(e) ≥ 0
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(∀e ∈ E) are satisfied. Then, checking whether x(P ) ≥ 1 + ε (∀P ∈ P) are
satisfied is transformed to solving the shortest (s, t)-path in D with respect to
the edge length x(e) (∀e ∈ E), and this can aslo be done in polynomial time.
In what follows, we aim at giving a succinct characterization of the least-core
for EPC-games. First give the linear program model of the max-flow problem on
D and its dual:
LP(flow):
max
∑m
j=1 yj
s.t.
{ ∑
Pj :ei∈Pj
yj ≤ 1 i = 1, 2, ..., n
yj ≥ 0 j = 1, 2, ...,m
(2)
DLP(flow) :
min
∑n
i=1 xi
s.t.
{∑
ei:ei∈Pj xi ≥ 1 j = 1, 2, ...,m
xi ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., n
(3)
Due to max-flow and min-cut theorem, the optimum value of (2) and (3) are
equal, and the set of optimal solutions of (3) is exactly the convex hull of the
indicator vectors of the minimum edge-cut of D, which is denoted by CE . On
the other hand, it is known that the core of the flow game Γf defined on D〈E〉
is also the convex hull of the indicator vectors of the minimum edge-cut of D.
Hence, we have
Theorem 1 Let ΓE and Γf be an EPC-game and a flow game defined on D =
(V,E; s, t), respectively, f∗ be the value of the max-flow of D. Then,
x ∈ LC(ΓE) if and only if x = z/f∗ for some z ∈ CE .
Proof. Let x = (1 + ε)z be a transformation, then (1) can be rewritten as
max ε
s.t.
 z(E) = 1/(1 + ε)z(P ) ≥ 1 ∀P ∈ P
zi ≥ 0 ∀ei ∈ E
(4)
Combining the first constraint z(E) = 1/(1 + ε) and the objective function
min{1 + ε}, it is easy to see that linear program (4) is the same as DLP(flow)
(3). Since the optimal value of (3) is also f∗, Theorem 1 thus follows. uunionsq
Based on the relationship between a VPC-game and the corresponding flow
game discussed in Section 3, we can obtain a similar result on the least-core for
VPC-games (The proof is omitted).
Theorem 2 Let ΓV = (E, γV ) be a VPC-game defined on D = (V,E; s, t), f
∗
be the value of the max-flow of D, then
x ∈ LC(ΓV ) if and only if x = z/f∗ for some z ∈ CV .
Here CV is the convex hull of the indicator vectors of minimum vertex-cuts in
D.
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Theorem 1 and 2 show that for the unit flow network, the least-core of the
PC-game is equivalent to the core of the corresponding flow game in the sense
of scaling down by 1/f∗. Hence, all the following problems for PC-games can be
solved efficiently:
– Computing the LC-value;
– Finding an imputation in LC(ΓE) and LC(ΓV );
– Checking whether a given imputation is in LC(ΓE) or LC(ΓV ).
Remark. Path cooperative games have close relationship with a non-cooperative
two-person zero-sum game, called path intercept game [21]. In this model, an
“evader” attempts to select a path P from the source to the sink through a
given network. At the same time, an “interdictor” attempts to select an edge
e in this network to detect the evader. If the evader traverses through arc e,
he is detected; otherwise, he goes undetected. The interdictor aims to find a
probabilistic “edge-inspection” strategy to maximize the average probability of
detecting the evader. While for the evader, he wants to find a ”path-selection
strategy” to minimize the interdiction probability. Aziz et al. [2] observed that
the mixed Nash Equilibrium of path intercept games is the same as the least-core
of EPC-games. With max-min theorem in matrix game theory, the same result
can be obtained based on the similar analysis as in the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Nucleolus of PC-games
In this section, we aim at showing that the nucleolus of PC-games can be com-
puted in polynomial time. Given a game Γ = (N, γ), Kopelowitz [15] showed
that the nucleolus η(Γ ) can be obtained by recursively solving the following
standard sequence of linear programs SLP (η(Γ )):
LPk
(k = 1, 2, · · · ) :
max ε
s.t.

x(S) = γ(S) + εr, ∀S ∈ Jr r = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1
x(S) ≥ γ(S) + εr, ∀∅ 6= S ⊂ N \ ∪k−1r=0Jr
x ∈ I(Γ ).
Initially, set J0 = {∅, N} and ε0 = 0. The number εr is the optimal value of
the r-th program LPr, and Jr = {S ⊆ N : x(S) = γ(S) + εr,∀x ∈ Xr}, where
Xr = {x ∈ Rn : (x, εr) is an optimal solution of LPr}.
As in the last section, we first discuss the nucleolus of EPC-games. Let ΓE
be the EPC-game associated with network D = (V,E; s, t) with |E| = n, P be
the set of all (s, t)-paths and f∗ be the value of the max-flow of D. Denote EΓ
be the set of coalitions consisting of one-edge coalitions and path coalitions, i.e.,
EΓ = {{e} : e ∈ E} ∪ {P ⊆ E : P ∈ P is an (s, t)-path}.
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We show that the sequential linear programs SLP (η(ΓE)) of EPC-game ΓE
can be simplified as follows.
LP ′k :
max ε
s.t.

x(e) = εr, ∀e ∈ Er, r = 0, 1, ..., k − 1
x(e) ≥ ε, ∀e ∈ E\⋃k−1r=0 Er
x(P ) = 1/f∗ + εr, ∀P ∈ Pr, r = 0, 1, ..., k − 1
x(P ) ≥ 1/f∗ + ε, ∀P ∈ P\⋃k−1r=0 Pr
x(e) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
x(E) = 1.
(5)
where εr is the optimum value of LPr, Xr = {x ∈ Rn : (x, εr) is an optimal
solution of LPr}, Pr = {P ∈ P : x(P ) = 1 + εr,∀x ∈ Xr} and Er = {e ∈ E :
x(e) = εr,∀x ∈ Xr}. Initially, ε0 = 0, P0 = ∅ and E0 = ∅.
Proposition 4 The nucleolus η(ΓE) of EPC-game ΓE defined on the network
D = (V,E; s, t) can be obtained by computing the linear programs LP ′k in (5).
Proof. Firstly, we show that in sequential linear programs SLP (η(Γ )), only the
constrains corresponding to the the coalitions in EΓ (i.e., the one-edge coalitions
and path coalitions) are necessary in determining the nucleolus η(ΓE).
In fact, for any winning coalition S ⊆ N (not a path), S can be decomposed
into a path P and some edges E′ = S\E(P ). Then,
x(S)− γ(S) = x(P )− 1 +
∑
e∈E′
x(e) ≥ x(P )− 1.
Since x(e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E′, S cannot be fixed before P or any e ∈ E′. After
P and all e ∈ E′ are fixed, S is also fixed, i.e., S is redundant. If S is a losing
coalition, then S is a set of edges with γ(S) = 0 and x(S)−γ(S) = ∑e∈S x(e) ≥
x(e),∀e ∈ S. That is to say, S cannot be fixed before any e ∈ S. When all
edges in S are fixed, S is fixed accordingly, i.e. S is also redundant in this case.
Therefore, deleting all the constrains corresponding to the coalitions not in EΓ
will not change the result of SLP (η(Γ )).
The key point in remainder of the proof is the correctness of the third and the
forth constrains in (5), where we replace the original constrains x(P ) = 1 + εr
and x(P ) ≥ 1 + ε in SLP (η(Γ )) with new constrains x(P ) = 1/f∗ + εr and
x(P ) ≥ 1/f∗ + ε, respectively.
In the process of solving the sequential linear programs, the optimal values
increase with k. Since C(ΓE) = ∅, we know ε1 < 0. Note that we can always
find an optimal solution such that ε1 > −1 (for example x(e) = 1n ,∀e ∈ E is a
feasible solution of the linear programming of LC(ΓE)).
We can divide the process into two stages. The first stage is the programs
with −1 < εr < 0. In this case, the constraints x(e) ≥ ε,∀e ∈ E cannot effect
the optimal solutions of the current programs, because x(e) ≥ 0. Ignoring the
invalid constraints we can get (5) directly.
The second stage is the programs with εr ≥ 0. When the programs arrive
at this stage, we can claim that all paths have been fixed. Otherwise, if there is
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a path satisfying x(p) = 1 + εr ≥ 1, then we have x(p) = 1 (note x(E) = 1),
contradicting with the precondition the value of maximum flow f∗ ≥ 2. Then
we can omit the path constraints in this stage and then this implies (5).
This completes the proof of Proposition 4. uunionsq
In the following, by making us the known results on the nucleolus of flow
games, we shall show that the nucleolus of PC-games can be solved in polynomial
time. Let Γf = (E, γ) be the flow game defined on the unit flow network D =
(V,E; s, t). It is easy to show that the sequential linear programs LP (η(Γf )) can
be simplified as L˜P k, (k = 1, 2, ...) :
L˜P k :
max ε
s.t.

x(e) = εr ∀e ∈ Er, r = 0, 1, ..., k − 1
x(P ) = 1 + εr ∀P ∈ Pr, r = 0, 1, ..., k − 1
x(e) ≥ ε ∀e ∈ E\⋃k−1r=0 Er
x(P ) ≥ 1 + ε ∀P ∈ P\⋃k−1r=0 Pr
x(E) = f∗,
(6)
where εr is the optimum value of L˜P r, Xr = {x ∈ Rn : (x, εr) is an optimal
solution of L˜P r}, Pr = {P ∈ P : x(P ) = 1 + εr,∀x ∈ Xr} and Er = {e ∈ E :
x(e) = εr,∀x ∈ Xr}. Initially, ε0 = 0, P0 = ∅ and E0 = ∅.
Deng et al. [5] proved that the sequential linear programs L˜P k, (k = 1, 2...)
can be transformed to another sequential linear programs with only polynomial
number of constrains, and it follows that the nucleolus of flow game η(Γf ) can
be found efficiently. Futhermore, Potters et al. [17], show that the nucleolus of
flow games with public edge can also be found in polynomial time when the core
is nonempty. Based on these known results, we discuss the algorithmic problem
on the nucleolus of PC-games in the following theorems.
Theorem 3 Let ΓE and Γf be the EPC-game and flow game defined on a unit
flow network D = (V,E; s, t), respectively. The nucleolus of ΓE can be computed
in polynomial time. Furthermore,
x ∈ η(ΓE) if and only if z = x · f∗ ∈ η(Γf ),
where f∗ is the value of the max-flow of D.
Proof. Notice that the dimension of the feasible regions of LP ′k(k = 1, 2...) de-
creases in each step, so we can end up the process within at most |N | steps.
The key point here is to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the optimal solutions of L˜P k (6) and that of LP
′
k (5) (∀k = 1, 2, · · · ).
We first prove that if (z∗, ε˜∗) is an optimal solution of L˜P k (6), the (x∗, ε∗) =
(z∗/f∗, ε˜∗/f∗) is an optimal solution of LP ′k (5).
When k = 1, we have E0 = ∅, P0 = ∅ in LP ′1. And it is easy to check the
feasibility and the optimality of (z∗, ε∗) in LP ′1. To continue the proof recursively,
we need to explain E1 = E˜1 and P1 = P˜1, i.e., the constrains which become
tight in every iteration are exactly the same in the two linear programs. For each
e ∈ E, if z∗(e) = ε˜∗, then x∗(e) = z∗(e)/f∗ = ε˜∗/f∗ = ε∗. And if z∗(e) > ε˜∗,
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then we have x∗(e) > ε∗. Thus, E1 = E˜1. P1 = P˜1 can be shown analogously.
The other direction of the result can be shown similarly. That is, the conclusion
holds for k = 1.
For the rest iteration k = 2, 3, · · · , the proof can be carried out in a same
way. Here we omit the detail of the proof. Since the nucleolus of flow game can
be found in polynomial time, it follows that the nucleolus of EPC-game is also
efficiently solvable. uunionsq
As for the nucleolus of VPC-games, we also show that it is polynomially
solvable based on the relationship between a VPC-game and the corresponding
flow game demonstrated in Section 3. Due to the space limitation, the proof of
the following theroem is omitted.
Theorem 4 The nucleolus of VPC-games can be solved in polynomial time.
PC-games on undirected networks. Given an undirected network D =
(V,E; s, t), we construct a directed network
−→
D = (V,
−→
E ; s, t) derived from D as
follows (see the following figure):
1. For edge e ∈ E with end vertices v1 and v2, transform it into two directed
edges −→e v1 = (v11, v12) and −→e v2 = (v21, v22);
2. Connect the two directed edges into a directed cycle via two supplemental
directed edges −→e 1 and −→e 2.
Thus, the EPC-game defined on undirected network D = (V,E; s, t) is trans-
formed to an EPC-game defined on the constructed directed network
−→
D =
(V,
−→
E ; s, t). Furthermore, it is easy to check that there exists one-to-one cor-
respondence for the game solution (such as, the core, the least-core and the
nucleolus) between the two games. As for a VPC-game defined on an undi-
rected network, we first transform it into EPC-game on an undirected network
as demonstrated in Section 3, and then transform it to EPC-game on a directed
network in the same way as above. Henceforth, the algorithmic results for PC-
games can be generalized from directed networks to undirected networks.
Theorem 5 Computing the least-core and the nucleolus can be done in polyno-
mial time for both EPC-games and VPC-games defined on undirected networks.
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